In this paper I test the efficiency with which the information contained in accounting-based value metrics, which use accounting information as inputs, is incorporated into initial public offering early market prices. I examine the association between these value metrics and first-day underpricing and three-year returns. I find accounting-based value metrics relative to market prices are associated with both the first-day underpricing and three-year returns, suggesting that the information contained in these metrics, which is available at the date of the initial public offering, is not efficiently impounded into prices. I then test to determine whether variations in investor sentiment affect the efficiency with which accounting-based value metrics are impounded into prices. I find that periods of more positive investor sentiment are associated with more inefficient use of accounting information, consistent with theoretical models of investor sentiment. ______________________________________________________________________________ This paper is part of my dissertation at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. I appreciate the helpful comments, suggestions, and insights from my dissertation committee: Mark Lang (Chair), Jeffery Abarbanell, Jennifer Conrad, John Hand, Wayne Landsman, and Jana Raedy. I have also benefited from discussions with and comments from
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational efficiency of early initial public offering (IPO) market prices with respect to accounting-based value metrics, and then to examine the effect of varying investor sentiment on this informational efficiency. Under traditional definitions of market efficiency, asset prices, including IPO market prices, would fully reflect all available and relevant information (Fama 1970) . A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that IPO prices do not represent fundamental values. 1 My first set of tests is designed to test the efficiency with which the value-relevant information contained in accounting-based value metrics is incorporated into IPO offer prices.
Although this test does not directly address why accounting information may or may not be properly impounded into IPO prices, it is a convenient starting point to first determine if accounting information is properly used. I test the efficiency of prices with respect to variety of accounting-based valuation metrics using two methods. First, I examine the relationship between accounting-based value metrics and the cross-sectional variation of future returns, which assumes that investors adjust for any potential inefficient pricing during the return measurement period. Second, I examine the relationship between those metrics and the crosssectional variation in underpricing (first-day return), which assumes that underwriters set offering prices efficiently with respect to the metrics.
I derive my accounting-based valuation metrics using market-based multiples. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this method is recommended and commonly used, at least by underwriters, as a starting point to value IPO firms.
2 Furthermore, direct valuation methods, such as the present value of future dividends or earnings and book value models, are difficult to implement in an IPO setting because limited information is available to measure the necessary model inputs (e.g., past time-series or forecasts).
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My second set of tests examines one potential cause for the inefficient use of accounting information, namely investor sentiment. In an efficient market, systematic asset mispricing that can be identified using accounting information should not occur, as arbitrageurs would trade away any mispricing. One potential explanation for persistent mispricing is found in the investor sentiment literature. 4 Investor sentiment models assume that noise traders respond to certain noisy signals in similar ways (i.e., "sentiment") and drive prices away from fundamental values.
If there is a risk that deviations from fundamental values will be maintained (or become more exaggerated), rational sophisticated market participants will not arbitrage the deviations away (Shiller 1984 , DeLong et al. 1990 ).
I use the IPO setting to investigate the inefficient use of accounting information for several reasons. First, as previously discussed, there is reason to believe that IPO prices are not efficiently set in general, making IPOs a convenient setting in which to examine the efficient use of accounting information, as well as the effects of varying investor sentiment. Second, prior literature provides a measurable proxy for investor sentiment for IPOs (Lee et al. 1991) . Third, 2 The use of market-based multiples has been discussed in practitioner, textbook, and academic literatures. For practitioner discussions of the use of multiples in IPO settings, see Weisman (1999) , McCarthy (1999) , Davisson (1990) , Joyce and Roosma (1991) , and Buck (1990) , among others. For textbook discussions on multiples, see Penman (2000) , Palepu et al. (1996) , and Benninga and Sarig (1997) , among others. For academic research studies exploring the use of multiples in pricing new issues, see Kim and Ritter (1999) , and more generally, see Kaplan and Ruback (1995) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , and Liu et al. (2000) . 3 The IPO firm prospectus is the only document permitted to be distributed by issuers prior to the effective date of the registration statement. The prospectus includes details about the company and the offering and the prior three years of audited financial statements to the SEC. Financial projections are prohibited in the prospectuses. 4 The investor sentiment literature has been used to explain other apparent asset pricing anomalies, such as the discount on closed-end mutual funds (Lee et al. 1991) .
the assumptions of the investor sentiment models, in particular the assumption that the marginal investor is an individual, are reasonable in an IPO setting (Weiss 1989) . Finally, survey evidence finds that only about one-fourth of survey respondents performed any fundamental analysis to derive values of IPO firms, which suggests that information in accounting-based value metrics may not be fully impounded into IPO prices (Shiller 1990) .
Results from the first set of tests (using long-run returns and first-day underpricing) in general support the hypothesis that the information contained in accounting data is not fully incorporated into IPO prices. In particular, the results indicate that various accounting-based value metrics compared with market price are positively associated with long-run returns and negatively associated with first-day underpricing. The results of the second set of tests suggest that varying investor sentiment affects the relationship of the ratio of various accounting-based value metrics to market price and both long-run returns and first-day underpricing. Results of the returns-based tests show that in high investor sentiment periods market-based value metrics are significantly correlated with future returns. I do not find a similar relationship in low investor sentiment periods. The results of my underpricing tests show that during all levels of investor sentiment, underpricing is correlated with the value metrics; this correlation is significantly larger in periods of high investor sentiment.
These results are consistent with investor sentiment models, which predict that during periods of higher investor sentiment, noise traders cause prices to deviate more from fundamental values than in lower investor sentiment periods. The results are robust to the inclusion of risk proxies, year and industry effects, a variety of specification checks (including ranked variables), and other control variables previously found to be correlated with long-run returns and underpricing.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature that examines the efficient use of accounting information in setting asset prices. Accounting researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the role of accounting information in firm valuation (Penman 1992; Bernard 1995) . 5 Within this valuation perspective, studies such as Frankel and Lee (1998) , Abarbanell and Bernard (2000) , Bushee (1997, 1998) , and many others examine the ability of a value estimate based on accounting information to predict future returns. 6 Results of this growing body of research suggest that asset prices are not always efficiently set with respect to accounting information. However, prior research has not investigated the role of varying investor sentiment on the efficient use of accounting information.
This paper provides evidence of the inefficiency of accounting-based value metrics in a specific setting (IPO firms) and shows that investor sentiment affects the efficiency with which the metrics are incorporated into asset prices. Additionally, this study adds to the IPO literature explaining cross-sectional variation in IPO returns, demonstrating, in particular, the extent to which publicly available accounting information is useful in predicting underpricing and longrun returns. The relationship found in this paper, which is conditioned upon investor sentiment, persists even after controlling for effects shown previously in the IPO literature to predict future returns.
This study also sheds light on the debates surrounding the existence and causes of the longrun underperformance and underpricing anomalies. By documenting an association between publicly available accounting information and future returns for high investor sentiment periods, 5 See Lee (1999) for a discussion of the valuation perspective and its impact on research. 6 This paradigm differs from the value relevance paradigm. The value relevance paradigm evaluates the value relevance of accounting information through its power in explaining contemporaneous returns or prices. The recently emerged valuation paradigm has shifted the focus to the relationship between accounting data and firm value, and therefore examines the relevance of accounting information explaining future (as opposed to contemporaneous) returns or prices.
this study provides evidence that the anomaly relates, at least in part, to market inefficiency with respect to accounting information, a form of investor irrationality. The finding that the market does not efficiently use comparable firm multiples in periods of high investor sentiment is consistent with the conjectures of prior research suggesting that market timing (also termed "windows of opportunity") may be partially responsible for the long-run underperformance of IPOs (Ritter 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995) .
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses background literature.
Section 3 discusses the research design, including the accounting information used in the analysis, price-based regressions, and returns-based regressions. Section 4 describes the sample.
Section 5 reports on the main empirical tests and section 6 on additional tests. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Background literature

IPO Anomalies
Hot issues markets and the variation in and the average low level of post-issue price performance are arguably some of the most poorly understood and widely debated empirical irregularities in the IPO and finance literatures. With respect to fluctuations in volume (hot issues markets), empirical evidence has documented cycles in both volume and average initial returns (ranging between 10%-15% on average) for IPO firms; these cycles vary widely on individual issues (Ibbotson and Jaffee 1975, among others) . With respect to post-issue price performance, Ritter (1997) finds that IPO firms from 1970 to 1993 underperformed size-matched comparison firms by an average of 5.6% per year from the end of the offering day until five years after the IPO. 7 This long-run underperformance varies across many factors including industries, firms, and years (Ritter 1991) . These anomalies have challenged researchers to identify and empirically test explanations for the findings.
The most prominent hypothesis explaining the intersection of these anomalies is market timing. Specifically, it suggests that the volume of IPOs in a particular period may be a function of firms' timing of the issues during periods of positive investor sentiment and/or high market valuations (Ritter 1991, Loughran and Ritter 1995) . If firms can identify the timing of this optimism, then it is likely that the firm will time the IPOs during these periods.
Prior research has found results consistent with the market timing hypothesis. Ritter (1991) finds a relationship between long-run underperformance and volume. Other research has found results consistent with fluctuations in volume reflecting variation in investor optimism (Rajan and Servaes 1997 , Lee et al. 1991 , and Helwege and Liang 1996 , Pagano et al. 1998 . However, none of the papers has investigated specific sources of information that investors are inefficiently impounding into prices as a result of the optimism. This paper addresses this issue. et al. (1990) derive a model of investor sentiment (i.e., modeling a market where assets may be priced away from intrinsic value). They consider a market with two types of traders: rational investors, who are informed of a stock's fundamental value, are risk averse, and have reasonably short investment horizons; and individual (i.e., noninstitutional) noise traders who trade on their own individual (potentially erroneous) heuristics. The model proposes that 7 This general phenomenon has been documented to occur when using industry matched returns (see Ritter 1991 and Rajan and Servaes 1997) and when including a control for book-to-market, a potential proxy for risk (see Loughran and Ritter 1995) . Additionally, the results are robust to various time periods (see Ritter 1991 , Loughran and Ritter 1995 , and Ritter 1997 .
Investor Sentiment
DeLong
when noise traders respond to a similar noisy signal (which I refer to as "sentiment"), their trading causes prices to deviate from fundamentals. Due to their risk aversion and short horizons, rational informed investors do not engage in arbitrage because there is a risk that the noise traders' beliefs will not revert to the true fundamental value for an extended period of time and prices may in fact move even further from the fundamental value. An arbitrageur who would have to close his position prior to full reversion to the fundamental value would suffer a loss. Lee et al. (1991) use the DeLong et al. model to investigate the closed-end mutual fund puzzle. Closed-end fund shares typically sell at market prices that are not equal to the per-share market value of the underlying assets held by the fund. In particular, closed-end funds are valued at discounts in the range of 10 to 20 percent. Lee et al. find that the timing of investor sentiment accounts for some of the discount. In further analysis, they find that the volume of IPO issuances in a given year is highly correlated with the closed-end fund discount, suggesting that the IPO volume can serve as a proxy for investor sentiment. While Lee et al. did investigate the effect of investor sentiment on asset prices overall in a closed-end fund setting, they did not identify a specific source of the mispricing. This paper attempts to address this issue in an IPO setting.
Research design
Valuation models and applicability to an IPO setting
A variety of models can be used in valuing businesses, and, given valid assumptions and perfectly measured inputs, all of the models will produce the same value. 8 Invalid assumptions and/or measurement error in the model inputs will produce different value estimates among the models, and a particular model will produce a superior value estimate for a given firm only to the extent to which these issues pose less of a problem for that model than they do for alternative models. IPO firm characteristics and limited information availability affect the ability of a particular model to provide a relevant value in an IPO setting.
A firm can be valued either directly by examining its financial information or indirectly by examining its financial information relative to that of other firms and based on past or projected information. The use of direct valuation models (i.e., book value, dividend discount, discounted cash flow models, and residual income) typically leads to a large number of measurement problems in an IPO setting for several reasons. First, there is a limited time series of financial information available from which to make projections. The preliminary prospectus, the only document permitted to be distributed by issuers prior to the effective date of the registration statement, includes only the prior three years' audited financial statements. Second, forecasts (management's or analysts') are not publicly available as of the IPO date. The SEC strictly prohibits management disclosures of financial projections in the prospectus. Finally, discount rates are difficult to estimate. For these reasons, the use of comparable firm market-based multiples is widely cited in practitioner literatures as a starting point for valuing IPO firms (Weisman 1999 , McCarthy 1999 , Davisson 1990 , Joyce and Roosma 1991 , Buck 1990 ).
Additionally, prior empirical research exploring the usefulness of accounting-based multiples in the pricing of IPO firms (Kim and Ritter 1999) has found a correlation between IPO prices set by underwriters and the market and value metrics based on multiples. For these reasons, I use multiples in my analysis. 
Multiples based on comparable firms
The accounting information used in the analysis in this paper is firm-specific book value and earnings measures applied to comparable firm multiples. A distinguishing feature of the use of multiples is that a value metric (V) can be directly derived for IPO firms, although metrics derived in this fashion do not represent true intrinsic value, since the multiples models are not complete economic valuation models.
A variety of multiples can be used, each containing two pieces: a value measure, and an accounting measure that is capitalized into value. For example, the price-earnings multiple contains a value measure (price), and an accounting measure (earnings) that is capitalized into value. This method relies on the market's assessment of the long-term growth and profitability prospects of comparable firms and, therefore, assumes market efficiency in the comparable firms. It does not require multiyear forecasts or assumptions regarding a discount rate and therefore is easy to use.
The multiples I use for the present analysis are based on the work of Kim and Ritter (1999) , who employ a variety of market-based multiples to explain the variation in early IPO prices, and on anecdotal evidence on the use of multiples in institutional settings (see, e.g., Weisman 1999 and Davisson 1990) . I calculate multiples based on both the market value of common equity (MVCE) and enterprise value (EV). Enterprise value is a measure of total firm value, calculated 9 I attempted the residual income approach by using the book value of the IPO firm and estimates of future earnings based on analysts' forecasts of comparable firms. However, measurement error in forecasting future earnings and/or difficulty in estimating the discount rate caused the value estimates to be noisy. There was little correlation between the value estimates with current price and future returns.
as market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash, as used in Kim and Ritter (1999 
where ipo = IPO firm; comp = median of comparable firms; t = IPO date; lfy = latest fiscal year before the IPO date; MVCE = market value of common equity; EV = enterprise value; BVCE = book value of common equity; EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization; and SALES = net sales.
In the above multiples, MVCE for the IPO firm is the unknown and is calculated based on the median of the comparable firms' multiples applied to the IPO firm's accounting data before the IPO date. With respect to the earnings measures, this assumes that pre-IPO accounting measures apply to post-IPO market valuation. This adds noise to the estimation of V, since it does not consider how the proceeds from the offer can enhance a firm's earnings. Note that for marketto-BV, I add the increase in book value from the offering to the resulting MVCE, since this information is available to investors at the IPO date.
Choice of comparable firms in multiples approach
Ideally, the calculation of value metrics should be based on a comparable firm having similar expected growth, risk, and profitability, and on comparable accounting-based measures, such as the level of quality and conservatism in the multiple. I base measures for these characteristics on anecdotal evidence regarding the selection of comparable firms in IPO valuation and on prior empirical work investigating the effect of the choice of comparable firms on the accuracy of using valuation multiples in general settings.
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The body of anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that comparable firms should be within the same industry as the IPO firm; therefore firms in this study are matched on three-digit SIC codes. With respect to growth patterns, several measures are used, all of which are measured before the IPO: the two-year average growth rates for revenues, earnings, and cash flows. With respect to risk, comparables are chosen using two measures: size, as measured by market value of equity, and capitalization, as measured by the long-term debt/equity and debt/capitalization ratios. Finally, with respect to profitability, I match firms on return on asset, return on equity, and profit margin measures.
Up to six matched firms are collected for each IPO firm. 12 For a firm to be considered here as a matched firm, it must be covered by CRSP and COMPUSTAT before the IPO date and have the same three-digit SIC code as the IPO firm. 13 From this set I select the six firms that are closest, in growth and risk measures, to the IPO firm. 14 The median multiple of the six comparable firms is applied to the IPO firm. 
Price-based tests
I begin by regressing the IPO prices, offering price (P 0 ) and first-day closing market price (P 1 ), on accounting-based value metrics available at the IPO date. Although not the main test in the study, this test has two purposes. First, results of the price-based tests are compared with the results of prior research to provide insight on the quality of and provide validation for the accounting measures used in this paper. Second, the results document the extent to which the underwriters and the market use value metrics based on market-based multiples in arriving at an early IPO price, which may assist in the interpretation of the results of the returns-based tests.
Note, however, that while price-based tests document the extent to which underwriters and the market impound the accounting information in valuation, they do not provide insight on the degree to which the market should have impounded this information.
The price-based tests posit that an IPO's price is a function of the value metrics based on the various comparable firms' multiples. The cross-sectional regression models, which line firms up in event time of the IPO, are
14 I include IPO firms having fewer than six, but at least three, matched firms in the analysis. The average number of matched firms for the IPO firms is over five, with over half of the IPO firms having six matched firms. Inferences are not changed when the sample is restricted to IPO firms having six matched firms. 15 I use the median to eliminate the effect of outlier comparable firms, which could have a large effect on the mean. Additionally, Weisman (1999) recommends the use of median averages.
for the offering price and the early market price respectively, where V is a value metric derived by using a market-based multiple.
If underwriters and investors are, on average, impounding the information in the comparable firm's multiples into their assessment of early market IPO prices, the coefficients β 1 and β 2 will be positive. The regression results will report β 1 and β 2 as cross-sectional constants; however, it is likely that firm-specific β 1s and β 2 s will vary due to differences in (i) the value relevance of V and (ii) the efficiency of P with respect to information in V. Issue (i) relates to measurement error in the independent variable, which likely introduces a downward bias to β 1 and β 2 . Issue
(ii) relates to measurement error in the dependent variable, which does not introduce additional bias into these coefficients unless it is systematically correlated with the independent variables.
Returns-based tests
Recall that the first purpose of this paper is to investigate the informational efficiency of early IPO market prices with respect to accounting information. To test for this requires a measure of price inefficiency, or the difference between the observed price and an efficient price, which I regress on value metrics based on accounting information. Obtaining a perfect measure of a true efficient price is empirically impossible. Therefore, I will use two proxies for the true measure of efficient price: price three years after the offer date adjusted for expected returns and the offering price set by the underwriter. In using price three years out adjusted for expected returns, I assume that any pricing inefficiency with respect to accounting information available at the IPO date is resolved by the end of three trading years. The advantage of this measure is that it allows for market forces to determine efficiency of prices (supply and demand in the market).
The disadvantages include the possibility that prices three years out are not efficient and/or inherent measurement error issues that arise using long-run return windows (e.g., estimating expected returns). In using initial offer price, I assume that underwriters are sophisticated market participants and set an efficient price with respect to accounting information. 16 The main advantage of using this measure is the avoidance of inherent noise issues that arise during longrun return windows. The main disadvantage is the possibility that underwriters do not set prices efficiently with respect to accounting-based value metrics. These two measures complement each other by functioning as differing measures of IPO price inefficiency.
Long-run returns tests
If the market inefficiently sets an early market price that is corrected within three years, then the market's price correction can be expressed as P 3yr -P 1 (where P 3yr is the market price three years after the IPO and P 1 is the market price on the first day of trading). 17 The returnsbased tests regress cumulative three-year returns defined as (P 3yr -P 1 ) / P 1 , adjusted for dividends and stock splits, on the various multiple-based value metrics used in equation (3), deflated by price (V/P 1 ). The returns-based cross-sectional regression model, which lines firms up in event time of the IPO, becomes
where V is the value computed using one of the six comparable firms multiples as discussed in section 3.3 above, Log (B/M) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio, Log (Size) is the 16 Although underwriters may have incentives to set IPO prices not equal to fundamental value (i.e., legal liability, reputation, successful offering, etc.), there is no reason to expect that these incentives would be correlated with accounting information. See Ritter (1997) (Fama and French 1992) . Including these variables is consistent with other IPO return models (Teoh et al. 1998 ).
Although V does not measure true intrinsic value, due to the inherent measurement error in using market-based multiples, as long as V measures cross-sectional differences in firm value then, similar to prior research, V/P 1 can be interpreted as a measure of excess value provided by the market on the first trading day of the IPO firm. 19 Consistent with prior research, I use the natural log to mitigate heteroskedasticity and to reduce the effect of outliers (Berger and Ofek 1995) .
If investors are not efficiently using comparable firm information available at the IPO date, β 3 will be positive irrespective of whether they under-or over-impounded the available information. This relationship is demonstrated by the following example (for simplicity, dividends are assumed to be zero). If the market's eventual correction of IPO mispricing is P 3yr
-P 1 , which is captured in IPOret, and the estimated correction is V -P 1 , then the relationship between the estimated and actual corrections can be expressed as P 3yr -P 1 = β 1 (V -P 1 ). 20 If P 1 is inefficient with respect to information in V and if the market corrects for this inefficiency during the three-year period (i.e., P 3yr -P 1 ), then β 3 will be positive. By specifying the model in terms of the relationship between V and P 1 , β 3 will be positive whether the market over-or underimpounded information in V. 21 Note that V does not need to reflect intrinsic value and V -P 1 does not need to move in the same direction as P 3yr -P 1 . However, what is required for results to obtain is that the cross-sectional variation in the difference between V -P 1 be correlated with the variation in P 3yr -P 1 .
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The relative magnitude of β 3 provides insight into the appropriateness of V. If β 3 = 1, the estimated correction is perfectly correlated with the eventual price correction. If 0 < β 3 < 1 , the estimated correction is less than the eventual price correction. If β 3 > 1, the estimated correction is larger than the eventual price correction.
Underpricing tests
Anecdotal evidence suggests that underwriters begin with valuation models when pricing IPO firms and then adjust this price based on demand information from investment bankers in the syndicate when setting the offering price, P 0 (Arkebauer 1998 , McCarthy 1999 , Lipman 1997 . The offering price is typically discounted 10%-30% for a variety of reasons, including the provision of a defensive mechanism for future lawsuits, should investors claim the issue was overpriced, and the attraction of institutional investors, whose participation helps to ensure 100% of the issue is sold. It is unknown exactly whether these incentives are correlated with accounting information; the assumption of this paper is that they are not. 21 Although theoretically possible, a negative value for β 1 would be odd in that it would suggest that the eventual correction was in a direction opposite than the estimated correction. 22 An alternative way to view the analysis is in terms of V/P 1 ratios, as in Frankel and Lee (1998) . If V measures intrinsic value, then the relationship with price should predict future returns. High (low) V/P 1 ratios suggest that price is low (high) relative to value and would predict positive (negative) returns.
Once trading commences on the market, the marginal investor sets the price. Initially, there is a bias toward institutional holdings of IPO firms based on existing relationships between underwriters and institutional investors and, given that institutional sales are in larger dollar amounts, the ease of selling the issue. However, empirical research has documented that within a relatively short time period after the offering, institutions hold only about 23% of the stock, with over 75% being held by individuals (Weiss 1989) . This suggests that, after the offering, an individual is likely the marginal investor.
Prior empirical research documents significant positive abnormal returns in the days following an IPO, suggesting that underwriters and the market value IPO firms differently. For purposes of this test I assume that underwriters are sophisticated market participants who incorporate all value-relevant accounting information into IPO prices. The difference between the underwriter's offer price, P 0 , and the early markets' price (i.e., the closing price on the first trading day), P 1 , then becomes a measure of the deviation between the markets' and the underwriters' assessments of fundamental IPO price.
Regressing this difference, P 1 -P 0 , on accounting-based valuation metrics determines whether the underwriters and the market differ in the manner in which accounting-based valuation metrics are impounded into their respective prices (assuming that these value metrics are independent of underwriter incentives to underprice IPOs).
The underpricing cross-sectional regression model, which lines firms up in event time of the IPO, becomes
where V is the value computed using one of the six comparable firms multiples as discussed in section 3.3 above, Log (GProc) is the natural log of gross proceeds from the offering, Log (OPrc) is the natural log of offering price, DPrc1 and DPrc3 are indicator variables for offering prices less than $1 and $3 respectively (Chalk and Peavy 1987) , and G is a vector of year indicator variables.
For the underpricing tests, β 7 can be interpreted in the same manner as β 3 in the long-run returns tests, except that β 7 will be negative. The reason the sign has flipped is that the long-run returns test is based on P 3yr -P 1 , where P 3yr is the measure of the efficient price; whereas the underpricing test is based on P 1 -P 0 , where P 0 is the measure of the efficient price.
Tests of effects of investor sentiment
The second objective of this paper is to examine the effect of varying investor sentiment on the efficient use of accounting information. This analysis is similar to the analysis in section 3.5, except that the V/P 1 metric is partitioned into high, medium, and low investor sentiment categories. My measure of investor sentiment, consistent with that of Lee et al. (1991) , is the annual volume of IPOs in a particular year. Although it would be possible to construct a continuous measure of investor sentiment based on IPO volume, measurement error issues would be problematic. In an attempt to increase the power of my tests, I partition investor sentiment into thirds (low, medium and high) based on IPO annual volume and test for robustness using other partitions. 23 I conduct the analysis by estimating a single regression model with a separate V/P 1 metric for each investor sentiment level, as well as estimating separate regressions for each 23 Inferences are generally unchanged given other various partitions, including 50%/50% low/high split and 25%/50%/25% low/medium/high split. Measurement error arising from use of a continuous measure proved to be problematic in the analysis. sentiment level, thus allowing the intercept and the control variables to vary across investor sentiment.
Data
Data There are other significant correlations between V/P 1 and other variables previously associated with IPO returns, suggesting the need for a multivariate analysis. Table 2 contains the results of the price-based tests. Panel A reports the results of using initial offering price as the dependent variable, while panel B reports those using the early market price. All models reveal a statistically significant relationship between first-day opening and closing IPO prices and multiple-based IPO value metrics, suggesting that information consistent with these value metrics is useful in both underwriters' and early markets' valuation of IPO firms. The explanatory power of the value metrics exceed those reported by Kim and Ritter (1999) , who document adjusted R-squares between 5%-10% in the regressions explaining offering prices when using an algorithm to select among recent IPOs in the selection of comparable firms. The increase in explanatory power of the multiples in this paper may be due to the difference in the samples and/or the choice of comparable firms. At any rate, the improved R 2 suggests that the choice of comparable firms in this study is reasonable in relative terms.
Results
Price-based results
It is also interesting to note that accounting-based valuation metrics do a better job of explaining the cross-sectional variation in initial offer prices than in early market prices. If the accounting-based valuation metrics are value-relevant, this is consistent with underwriters'
pricing new issues more efficiently with respect to these metrics than does the market.
Another interesting result is that the metric based on market-to-BV has both a larger coefficient and higher explanatory power than the metrics based on the other multiples. This is due to the construction of the metric, which adds the amount of the proceeds per share to the resulting value metric based on the multiple. This is necessary, since the proceeds per share increase the book value of the firm as well as the equity price.
Return-based tests
The results of the long-run returns regression for the full sample (i.e., not partitioned across varying investor sentiment) provides evidence of the informational efficiency of the value metrics (table3, panel A). The coefficient on V/P 1 is statistically significant for all but one of multiples, suggesting that the market is not efficiently impounding the information contained in those multiples into the early pricing of the IPO firm (P 1 ). The variables Log (B/M) and Log (Size) are included in the regression as potential omitted risk factors, but while both are in the usual predicted direction, neither is significant. This is fairly consistent with Teoh et al. (1998) , who find very weak significance for Log (Size) and no significance for Log (B/M). The coefficient on the market return is positive and highly significant, as expected. Table 3 , panel B provides the results of the underpricing regression for the full sample. The coefficient on V/P 1 is highly significant for all of the multiples, indicating a significant difference between the manner in which underwriters and the early market impound the information contained in accounting-based value metrics into early prices. Assuming the underwriters are rational, sophisticated investors and price efficiently with respect to value metrics, this finding provides additional evidence that the market inefficiently uses information contained in the value metrics in early IPO pricing.
Overall, all but one of the value metrics provide consistent results across the long-run returns and the underpricing tests, suggesting that information contained in the metrics is not efficiently impounded in the markets' early pricing of IPO firms. The V/P 1 based on market-to-BV is not significant in explaining long-run IPO returns but is significant in explaining underpricing.
These contrary results leave open the question of the efficiency with which this metric is efficiently impounded into early IPO prices. The insignificant results in the long-run returns test could mean that the market is efficiently impounding the information contained in the metric in the early pricing of the firm. Consistent with this, the significance of V/P 1 in the underpricing test could be picking up effects of proceeds, which have previously been documented to have an effect on underpricing, and may be correlated with underwriters' incentives to underprice rather than the market's inefficiently impounding the metric into early prices. On the other hand, perhaps the market is inefficiently impounding the information contained in the metric, but the long-run returns test fails to document this due to measurement error and/or large standard errors. For these reasons, the market-to-BV multiple is dropped from further analysis in the paper. 
Effects of Investor Sentiment
The results of the returns regression for the full sample (table 4, 24 Prior empirical research has documented that multiples based on book value perform worse than those based on most earnings measures in terms of valuation accuracy (Liu et al., 2000) . Table 4 , panel B provides the results of the underpricing regression for the full sample, estimating a single regression model with a separate V/P 1 metric for each investor sentiment level. All of the coefficient estimates on V/P 1 are statistically significant, suggesting that information in V is inefficiently impounded into P 1 regardless of investor sentiment. However, the effect is significantly larger in high-versus low-sentiment periods, consistent with investor sentiment models and again suggesting that market timing may be partially responsible for the documented long-run underperformance of IPOs.
I also estimate separate regressions for each sentiment level, thus allowing the intercept and the control variables to vary across investor sentiment. Results (not reported) are consistent with the results of the single specification reported here for both long-run returns and underpricing.
Additional tests
Ranked regressions
As a robustness test I re-estimate my models using ranked values of V/P, both overall ranks (not reported) and ranks by industry (reported) to ensure that the results are not being driven by just a few observations or distributional properties in the variable V/P. 25 Also, ranked regressions provide insight on the degree to which measurement error affects the main results.
Regarding measurement error, note that the relationship of V/P 1 relates to β 2 in equation (7). If β 2 in equation (7) were truly constant across firms, then there would be no variation in V/P 1 .
However, recall that the relationship between V and P (i.e., β 2 in equation 7) will vary among firms due to differences in (i) the value relevance of V and (ii) the efficiency of P with respect to information in V. The goal of the returns-based regression is to measure the effects of issue (ii).
Issue (i) introduces measurement error into V/P 1 , which likely will bias the coefficient downwards.
In an attempt to mitigate the effects of measurement error in V/P 1 , the variable is ranked by industry and converted to a value between 0 and 1. Measurement error is a function of the value relevance of V, which depends on the usefulness of the multiples approach and is likely related to industry. 26 To the extent to which measurement error differs across industries, rescaling V/P 1 by industry will thus help alleviate measurement error effects.
Results of the long-run returns and underpricing regressions using ranked V/P 1 are reported in table 3, panels A and B. The relationships between the V/P 1 s and the returns variables are generally strengthened when ranked regressions are used, suggesting that measurement error in V/P 1 is an issue at the margin. However, the insignificance of the metric based on market-to-BV in the long-run returns regressions remains, suggesting that measurement error may not be the reason behind the lack of results.
Regressions by year and industry
It is possible either that the results are due to contemporaneous correlations of error terms by year or that certain years are driving the results. To control for these possibilities, I estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) panel regressions by year, for each year having at least 30 observations, and, by treating each year as an observation, calculate the average coefficient and related tstatistic. 27 I perform this analysis for both the long-run returns and underpricing tests.
26 Weisman (1999) explains that the usefulness of the multiples approach depends on the classification of the firm, specifically whether it is a mature firm, emerging growth firm, etc.; this classification is likely related to industry. inefficiently with respect to information contained in market-based multiples.
I also estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions across low-sentiment and medium-and highsentiment years to test the robustness of the finding that investor sentiment affects the informational efficiency of early IPO prices and value metrics. For the long-run returns test, the average coefficient across low-sentiment years is generally positive, but not significant, whereas the average coefficient across both mid-and high-sentiment years is positive and significant. For the underpricing tests, the average coefficient is negative and significant across the two groups of years, although the average coefficient is a smaller negative value in the low-sentiment years, supporting the earlier results indicating that investor sentiment affects the informational efficiency of information contained in market-based accounting metrics.
It is also possible either that the results may be due to correlations of error terms within industries or that certain industries may be driving the results. To control for these possibilities, I
estimate cross-sectional regressions for each major industry classification with at least 30 observations in the sample and calculate the average coefficient and related t-statistic, treating each industry as an observation. Again, the results are robust. The long-run returns (underpricing) tests yield significant positive (negative) coefficients on the V/P 1 variable, supporting the main results of the paper.
Regression with additional control variables
Prior literature has identified several variables correlated with long-run IPO returns that were not included in the main analysis of this paper because of the limits they place on sample size.
As a robustness test, I include these measures in the returns-based model specifications to determine whether the explanatory power of V/P 1 remains after controlling for the variables. In a multivariate analysis, Ritter (1991) finds significant positive coefficients for age, market return, and bank indicator measures; significant negative coefficients for volume and oil indicator measures; and an insignificant coefficient for the initial return measure. Teoh et al. (1998) expand the model in Ritter (1991) by including accrual variables to test whether earnings management of IPOs explains long-run returns and find their measure of current discretionary accruals to have explanatory power for three-year-ahead returns. 28 They rank the accrual variable into four groups, with 0 representing the most conservative earnings managers and 3
representing the most aggressive earnings managers, and find a negative relationship between this measure and future IPO returns. Table 6 reports the results of various models that include the additional control variables for the market-to-sales multiple. The significant positive relationship between V/P 1 and returns is robust across various model specifications. Additionally, the control variables for size, market return and earnings management are in the same sign and are generally significant, as documented in prior research. However, the underpricing and the age variables yield results inconsistent with prior research: while Ritter (1991) found a positive relationship between age and IPO returns and Teoh et al. (1998) found no significant relationship, I document a negative 28 The discretionary accrual variables measured by Teoh et al. (1998) are measured as of the fiscal reporting period after the IPO, while the information contained in the models in this paper are measured at or before the IPO date. Inclusion of the discretionary accrual variable creates a "look-ahead bias," since the returns measured in this paper begin at the first day of trading. Nevertheless, I include them as control variables.
relationship. Similarly, neither Ritter nor Teoh et al. found a significant relationship between underpricing and future IPO returns, while I document a positive relationship in a multivariate analysis, which is counterintuitive. An evaluation of the univariate analysis shows both age and underpricing to be correlated with other independent variables in the regression, so perhaps they are picking up some of the measurement error in the other variables.
Trading strategy
A trading strategy using the multiples is not easily implementable in this setting because investors are unable to evaluate all IPOs on a single date. Each offering must be separately evaluated as it comes to market, and therefore investors cannot form relative rankings of V/P 1 s to create long and short portfolios at a specific point in time. Implementability, however, is not required in order to answer the question of whether there is market inefficiency with respect to accounting information in the pricing of IPO firms. This paper provides some insights on the returns that could be earned if such a strategy could be implemented.
In terms of the accumulation technique for abnormal returns, there is controversy over whether buy-and-hold or cumulative abnormal returns should be used in detecting long-run abnormal stock returns; therefore, I use both measures in my analysis. 29 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the portfolio of N firms over t days are calculated as
29 Fama (1998) suggests the use of cumulative abnormal returns, since buy-and-hold returns pose theoretical and statistical problems, including skewness in distribution, the exaggeration of initial difference through compounding, and the cross-correlation problems that occur due to time period overlap. On the other hand, Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the magnitude of the buy-and-hold return is the relevant measure for the investor. Additionally, they document that CARs are biased predictors of BHAR. In particular, when BHAR is less than zero, then CAR is greater than BHAR.
where R i, t = simple daily return for firm i, and R b, t = simple daily return for market.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the portfolio are calculated as
As in the returns-based tests, I use the NASDAQ value-weighted market return as the market return for firms trading on the NASDAQ and the NYSE/AMEX value-weighted market return as the market return for firms trading on the NYSE or AMEX.
Results for only the market-to-sales value metric are presented, but all income statement metrics provide similar results. The mean BHAR and CAR returns are presented in figures 1 and 2 respectively. These abnormal returns are adjusted for the mean IPO return (i.e., the graph is centered on the x axis). The results for average buy-and-hold returns are those that would have been earned by an investor if the trading strategy had been implemented, and they indicate that the return differential between a long and a short portfolio of stocks created based on a multiples strategy is approximately 20% over three years. Other analyses of returns find qualitatively similar results, including results of mean returns not adjusted for outliers, median returns, and continuously compounded returns.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to determine whether investors use accounting information efficiently in setting early market prices of initial public offerings and to examine the effects of varying investor sentiment on this efficiency. The presence of the long-run underperformance anomaly, variation in the level of price performance, and underpricing makes IPO firms an intriguing setting for an examination of the extent to which the market efficiently uses accounting information in setting early prices.
Using a sample of IPOs from 1980-1995, I examined the association between market-based value metrics based on comparable firm's multiples (created using accounting information) and two separate measures of inefficient IPO pricing. The first measure is the amount of first-day returns, which assumes that underwriters are sophisticated market participants and set prices efficiently. The second measure is three-year returns, which assumes that any inefficiency in IPO prices is corrected by market participants within three years of the IPO.
Subsequent tests were directed at uncovering the role of varying investor sentiment on the efficiency of IPO prices with respect to accounting information. Investor sentiment models predict that, during periods of high or positive investor sentiment, noise traders will cause prices to deviate from fundamental value and sophisticated investors will rationally fail to cause prices to return to fundamental values.
Results are consistent with the notion that investors do not efficiently impound the information contained in accounting-based comparable firm's multiples. In particular, I found statistically significant associations between my multiples-based value metrics and both first-day returns and three-year returns. Results are consistent across all multiples measures and are robust to a variety of controls and alternative specifications, including yearly and industry effects and other control variables previously found to be correlated with future IPO returns.
Additional tests confirmed that varying investor sentiment affects these relationships. I
found that during periods of high investor sentiment the relationships between returns and the value metrics are stronger than in low-sentiment periods. These results suggest that investor sentiment plays a potentially significant role in the efficiency of IPO pricing with respect to accounting information. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Enterprise value is market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash, and underpricing is the first-day IPO return. Data are from Securities Data Corporation, the Center for Research on Securities Prices, and COMPUSTAT. Age is from Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks. Only positive accounting measures (e.g., Sales) and related measures (e.g., market-to-sales, V based on market-to-sales, and V/P 1 based on market-to-sales) are included in the sample for each respective measure. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Log (GProc) is the natural log of gross proceeds from the offering. Log (OPrc) is the natural log of offering price. V/P 1 is an accounting-based value metric based on the respective multiple to first-day market price. Log (B/M) is the natural log of book value to market value. Log (Size) is the natural log of market capitalization. Age is the age of the firm at the time of going public where firms founded before 1901 are treated as founded in 1901. Under is the first-day market-adjusted return. DCA is discretionary accruals variable taken from Teoh et al. (1998) .
Log (Gproc)
Log ( Notes: IPOret is three-year raw cumulative IPO returns. V/P 1 is an accounting-based value metric based on the ratio of the respective multiple to first-day market price, Log (B/M) is the ratio of natural log of book value to market value, MKTret is three-year raw cumulative market returns, and Log (Size) is the natural log of market capitalization. F β and ? β are vectors of industry and year indicators, respectively. BV is book value. Pretax is pretax income; EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; and enterprise value is market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash. Comparable firm multiples-based value to price (V/P 1 ) are ranked to fall between 0 and 1, by industry; all other variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Yearly fixed effects and industry effects not reported. The most influential 1% of observations (as denoted by the Cook's D statistic) were deleted from the analysis. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Under is the first-day market-adjusted return. V/P 1 is an accounting-based value metric based on the ratio of the respective multiple to first-day market price, Log (Pro) is the logarithim of the gross offer proceeds, and Log (Price) is the logarithm of the offer price. ? β is a vector of industry and year indicators. BV is book value; pretax is pretax income; EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; and enterprise value is market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash. All others variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Yearly fixed effects not reported. The most influential 1% of observations (as denoted by the Cook's D statistic) were deleted from the analysis. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ . Log (V/P 1 ) is the natural log of the accounting-based value metric based on the ratio of the respective multiple to first-day market price, Log (B/M) is the natural log of book value to market value, MKTret is three-year raw cumulative market returns, and Log (Size) is the natural log of market capitalization. F β and ? β are vectors of industry and year indicators, respectively. Pretax is pretax income; EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; and enterprise value is market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Yearly fixed effects and industry effects not reported. The most influential 1% of observations (as denoted by the Cook's D statistic) were deleted from the analysis. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: IPOret is three-year raw cumulative IPO returns. V/P 1 is an accounting-based value metric based on the ratio of the respective multiple to first-day market price, Log (B/M) is the natural log of book value to market value, MKTret is three-year raw cumulative market returns, Log (Size) is the natural log of market capitalization, Under is the first-day market-adjusted return, Age is the age of the firm at the time of going public where firms existing before 1901 are treated as beginning in 1901, and DCA is a discretionary accruals variable taken from Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) . F β and ? β are vectors of industry and year indicators respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Yearly fixed effects and industry effects not reported. The most influential 1% of observations (as denoted by the Cook's D statistic) were deleted from the analysis. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
